

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

DEFENSE INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE
IS IT POSSIBLE?

by

EDUARDO HARTZ OLIVEIRA
Captain, Brazilian Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy, and neither the Brazilian Government.

22 May 2002

TABLE NTENTS

<u>Introduction</u>	iii
<u>A valid prediction range</u>	1
<u>Perspectives of a Regional Defense Arrangement</u>	1
<u>Perspectives of a Hemispheric Defense Arrangement</u>	7
<u>Security from a Brazilian Standpoint</u>	13
<u>Conclusion</u>	16

Introduction

“Fill each other’s cup, but drink not from one cup. Give one another of your bread, but eat not from the same loaf. . . . Even as the strings of a lute are alone, thought they quiver with the same music.”¹ With these words, Kahlil Gibran tried to establish an axiom to the ideal relationship in marriage. The thesis that I submit is that, the truism in this philosophical text constitutes the best image of the only possible shape, of any kind of collective agreement or arrangement, toward defense or security in the American hemisphere. In other words, an opened or loose agreement, established in ad hoc and non permanent basis.

In the argumentation process, we will focus, initially, the period covered by the analyses and forecasting in this paper. Next, we will discuss the pros and cons of defense arrangements initially at regional and after on the hemispheric level. In the sequence, we will concentrate our analyses on the Brazilian defense perspective, being this country the main South American actor. Finally, under a conclusive topic, we will gather all the main conclusions that emerged from the analyses, summarizing our argumentation.

A valid prediction range

Since 1989, we have lived through a relatively short period, and yet, we have seen sweeping changes in global realities, and with such an unpredictable character that no one could bear in mind. For instance, in 1979 — the year when Afghanistan was invaded by what was then the Soviet Union in the high spot of the Brezhnev era — who could have foreseen that ten years later the Berlin Wall would fall and the Soviet Union, itself, would cease to exist. In another example in 1980, who could foresee a war state between Argentina and England two years later? This "quasi" unpredictable feature on the international affairs is an important aspect to bear in mind, when establishing the range and amplitude of any prospective analysis.

An alternative to by-pass the concern about the range is by altering the predicting model, focusing the analysis on those future trends that are based on plans and projects already in place or with its implementation equated, taking in account, as a predicting range, the perceived period needed to fulfill their implementation and direct decurrent consequences. This *event-shaped range* will be the model adopted in this paper.

Perspectives of a Regional Defense Arrangement

The concept of regional, collective, cooperative, or multilateral defense has never been popular in South America.² In general, the South American countries prefer an environment of independent sovereign states with no subordination to any kind of supranational organism.³ Nevertheless, let's analyze the arguments in favor and against a regional defense arrangement in South America.

Under a generic perspective, the development of some sort of security arrangement would be a natural evolution to face a new multipolar world, a regional substitute to

the old, exhausted and impoverished hemispheric defense systems such as the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 or the OAS charter of 1948.

In the geopolitical point of view, the absence of a significant regional asymmetry, due to the comparable political, economic, and military strengths of all the countries, facilitating an equalitarian base for talking; and the advantage of being gathered in a same geographic region, facilitating the implementation of diverse linking networks, and the establishment of common objectives, constitutes favorable aspects to a collective defense arrangement.

The actual independence in terms of military hardware, from the US or other predetermined supplier, allows wider a perspective and the flexibility for developing an independent defense system on South American without the necessary presence, sanction or leadership of extra-continental powers.

In a preliminary analysis, some threats treated as asymmetric like narcotrafficking, terrorism, and insurgency movements, which may be gathered under the general concept of Transnational Threats (TNTs), could act as the actual triggers to the creation of regional defense system. In the case of narcotrafficking, the most intense TNT, the power of those criminal organizations outguns and outnumber the security and police forces of the majority of countries in South America, taken separately. Therefore, a logical way of facing this asymmetric overwhelming threat would be with the aid of a multinational military force, capable of acting without the constraints of interstate borders.

Other aspects that would endorse a regional defense arrangement would be the benefits of sharing costs, the possibility of joint problems solving, and its relevance as a regional peacekeeping instrument, although one could argue that a peaceful environment and good diplomatic relations, should be the foundation of a defense arrangement, not its objective or

by-product.

Finally, as a defense arrangement in South America would be superimposed on existing economic and trade agreements, there is the successful example of NATO, a military alliance linked to an economic agreement, aspect that raises an opportune question: despite the reverse historical sequence — the military alliance before the economic agreement — is this European precedent an endorsement to build a defensive alliance in response to MERCOSUR? There are a number of reasons to be a disbeliever about this possibility.

The history of the region has demonstrated a constant opposition to the formation of a multilateral military structure to prevent or resolve armed conflicts. South American countries have responded to potentially destabilizing situations with the formation of ad hoc or bilateral negotiations, outside the formal Inter-American system. The first of such grouping, worthy of mention in the 20th century, was the Group of Guarantor Nations, established to resolve the conflict that threatened the Equatorian sovereignty in 1942, gathering US, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. A second example would be the Contadora Group, formed by Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and Mexico, to resolve security conflicts in Central America during the 80's.

The Rio Group, established in 1986 with the adoption of the Declaration of Rio de Janeiro, gathering 19 Latin American and Caribbean countries, is the corollary to the mentioned preferable temporary and ad hoc characteristic of defense and security coalitions in South America. The alleged purposes of this agreement were: to find solutions to regional conflicts; and to create initiatives to improve Inter-American relations, through dialogue and cooperation.

These objectives presupposes a more permanent character in the agreement, antago-

nizing the ad hoc and temporary characteristic, but analyzing the achievements of the Rio Group, we can verify that there has been important accomplishments related to the dialogue and cooperation objective. Today, the Rio Group have become a forum of the greatest political importance for Latin America and the Caribbean, evidenced by the creation of a nuclear weapons free-zone, and the regional adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime. But the resistance begins when the issue is collective defense or security, as we can deduce from the fact that the Declaration of Santiago (1991), which affirmed that — regional security depends on democratic stability, and that a joint political action should be formulated to stop any threat to this stability — remained only as a written proposition, not followed by any concrete action so far.

In the governmental sphere, the neoliberal ideologies that have orientated the economic transformations in South America, have adopted the practice of reducing to a minimum the State's dimension and expenses, and as a consequence, the budgets to the military forces. These limited resources have exacted its burden in terms of reduced training, operational readiness, aging and obsolescence of equipment, and a growing silent discontentment among military leaders, which do not feel motivated and confident to embark in a multinational commitment, having enormous problems pending in their own national forces. Furthermore, due this resource restriction, a great number of countries in South America have only a limited military capability, and cannot assume external commitments. Therefore, these deficiencies would demand compensation in terms of extra resources drained from other regional states in better condition, and even those, endowed with better economic situation, can only marginally meet their specific needs. In the NATO's case, for example, there was the provision of economic aid to the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, prior to their admittance in the alliance, but in this case, NATO and its state members were able to subsidize some of

these costs.

Another aspect worthy of mention is the military perception of state sovereignty in South America. Several sub-regional economic agreements have produced an increasing integration among states, practically demising economic frontiers. However, and despite all these integration processes, the military retained some of the legacy of rivalries that for almost a century permeated the regional relations, mainly in the Southern Cone. With a “xenophobic” mindset, a considerable number of senior military fears that a defense alliance, would possibly mitigate the existing political frontiers, and this would collide with one of the stated main purposes of the military forces — the perseverance of the national integrity and sovereignty. In short, it is an intriguing fact that the same military, who unleashed the confidence building process in the Southern Cone, which led to an increasingly integrated regional economic system, constitutes, in the majority of these countries, the significant stronghold against any regional collective defense or security agreement.

The successful integration path opened by the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), and the increasing integration among South American military forces, evidenced throughout continuous military exercises and exchange in several levels, could be used as an argument that the alleged rivalries among South American countries constitute an outdated mindset. However, the reality behind this entire rapprochement is that the philosophical axiom of Kahlil Gibran⁴ is also the best definition to the relations among militaries in South America, and decurrently, a sufficient mature level to overcome decades of rivalries and distrust has not yet been reached. In this respect, South America lives through an adaptation phase to a new reality, but still carries some past reminiscences, resulting in a still fragile foundation for a defense alliance. Nevertheless, there could be an argument that the same distrust, or even worst, existed in the post-war Europe of 1945, and that this disbelief did not prevent the

creation of NATO; but in that case, there was a common threat, a hostile overwhelming super-power, and thus, the need to build a collective defense. In the actual case of South America, there is no such commonly perceived external threat that could act as a triggering effect.

The above consideration brings us to a concluding aspect on the impracticable character of a permanent collective defense arrangement in South America, and that is, the absence of a internal or external common and permanent threat.

Considering threats internally originated, drug trafficking is by far the main concern to some countries in the region. Despite its nature is still unwell defined, the South American trend is to consider this threat as a law enforcement case to be addressed by police and security agencies, and to which the armed forces could lend, at the most, logistical and intelligence support. In other words, due to the current perceived nature of the drug threat — a law enforcement case — a military alliance would not be the adequate instrument

Considering external threats, some military analysts, mainly in Brazil, have already identified a specific set of permanent peril. These external threats — as we will address further in our analyses — are focused, mainly, on the Brazilian Amazonic region — and do not constitute a direct threat to the entirety of countries in a South America. This restrictive observation is significant, to the extent that South America is still in the building process of its geopolitical unity perception, or a “*circumstance perception*”, that would accept the premise of — the aggression to one would mean an aggression to all. This “*circumstance perception*” corresponds to the Spanish philosopher and essayist José Ortega Y Gasset’s formulation: “I am I and my circumstances.”⁵ This formulation prescribes that know one is an isolated self; every person is related to his specific circumstances. Adapting this concept to a nation, each South American country should have South America as its geopolitical circumstance.⁶

Summarizing, despite the existence of favorable arguments, which could, in a unpredicted future, forge the foundations of a defense agreement or alliance gathering South American countries, the nature of the counter-arguments, intrinsic to the history and deep beliefs of most South American policymakers, and strengthened by the real constraints of limited resources, indicates that, in the scope of a predictable future, based on the proposed event-shaped range, the only type of defense agreements or coalitions capable of emerge will be on a ad hoc and temporary bases.

Perspectives of a Hemispheric Defense Arrangement

We could establish as a first and definite argument against a defense establishment at hemispheric level, the absence of such tendency and desire at regional level, in South America. Nevertheless, there are other meaningful aspects to be analyzed, and these deal with the disappointing and frustrating past experiences on such type of enterprises, as well as, in the present time, on the fear and resentment towards the implicit hemispheric leader, the United States.

In December 2, 1823, the US President Monroe declared, on its seventh annual message to Congress, that — the European Powers where on notice that American continents were off limits to European colonization and that any attempts to interfere with American lands would be considered the "manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." This statement, which became part of the Monroe Doctrine, may be considered the first hemispheric concept of defense.

Later, in June 1942, the Japanese aggression to United States led to the creation of the

Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and five years later, in 1947, the fear of the Soviet expansionism, guided to the signature of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). The common aspect of all these treaties was the fact that they never got away from their written and idealized intentions.

What should be the culminating point to all hemispheric integration process, the signing of the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter in 1948 became another frustrated initiative in terms of ascertaining a collective defense system.

South American countries have always felt the weight of the US hegemonic power, and with the fear of intervention in their sovereignty they have, systematically, rejected the idea of participating directly in an over-arching hemispheric security organization.⁷ The highlight of this awareness can be set during the Cold War, where the existing fear of the hegemonic manipulation by the US had even overshadowed, among South American countries, the fear of an extra-hemispheric Communist aggression, and for this reason, the IADB was not incorporated as part of the OAS, and the Rio Treaty was left without a formal military organization.⁸

All of the unmatched perspectives in the existing hemispheric treaties, and the priority given by the US to its affairs with its northern allies, created a North - South gap in terms of integration, which was continuously widening during Cold War as a result from the several US interventions on South American countries internal politics. These interventions, in most of the times, occurred through unilateral military display of power or through insidious actions, and their intent, some times, were not coherent to US propagated values of freedom and democracy, as was the case of the support to military governments and dictatorships, evidencing the philosophy of the “ends justifying the means”. Gradually it became clear, giving birth to a mélange of fear and resentments, that the US direct vital interests, rather than a consistent and permanent policy, dictated its concerns towards South America.

Besides the past resentments and actual fears, another obstacle to a hemispheric security concept is the absence of a common threat perception and common or standard engagement policy. If we understand collective defense or any other similar agreement, as the joint effort, among a group of nations, to collectively address and overcome perceived threats, it is clear that a common perception of what constitutes “threat to national or collective security”, as well a common procedure to the engagement method to overcome the threats are basic prerequisites.

The disparity between US and South American countries, in terms of threat perception and its engagement procedures is evident in a significant number of events. For instance, South American nations have historically viewed hemispheric security dilemmas, such as those existing in Central America in the 1980’s, in a different way from the US. While the US government focused on the extra-hemispheric support received by the insurgent movements, and opposed them by military means, the South American countries preferred to focus on what they viewed as the root causes of these conflicts: economic and social inequalities, and in the direct address to these social problems the primary course of action.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the decurrent East-West tension, a new array of threats came to evidence. These threats were not new, but since the end of the Cold War, they received increased attention, especially as the US has struggled to find a new foundation for its security engagement policy with South America.

Drug trafficking, smuggling, terrorism, and subversion are all TNTs that endangers government’s security and legitimacy by weakening institutions of law and order, and often replaces government authority in remote areas. From these TNTs, drugs are by far the most sensible issue on the North-South hemispheric relations. The cycle of drug production and trafficking is a subject that generates divergent perceptions on the nature and origin of the threat.

The US has historically viewed the problem posed by illicit drug consumption as originating in the drug producer nations of South America. For this reason, US drug policy, for decades, has emphasized the “supply side” approach, resorting to the means of war to promote drug eradication, crop substitution, and interdiction of illicit shipments, bound to the US.

South Americans, on the other hand, have consistently viewed the problem as the product of the enormous demand for consumption existing in US. The logic of this Southern approach is that, no matter how effectively the interdiction of drugs occur in one sight or country, the existing demand will generate production on another location or country, and the cycle will survive, as long as the demand — the source off all money — exists.

Another difference in perception, related to the threat of drugs, is the way of confronting the problem. Since the end of the Cold War, US have assumed an aggressive posture, encouraging, and in many cases coercing, South American countries to take such aggressive stand toward drug production and trafficking.

The violence, bloodshed, and instability associated to this course of action, as in the current case of Colombia, has promoted more prejudice to the lives of innocent people and in the country’s incipient economy, by means of social unrest and enormous waves of emigration, that in the intended objectives, the drug “cartels” and drug production. However, these problems do not seem to be in the concern of US policymakers, as long as their immediate defined objectives are accomplished.

In the South American perspective, drug trafficking is also a major threat, but aside the existence of a demand, the basic reasons for the popular adherence to the drug production and trafficking cycle is their poverty condition. The inability of local governments to elimi-

nate the existing economic and social inequalities and the decurrent lack of options to develop minimum standards of life — housing, alimentation, health and education — generates a perspective and need, which is currently being fulfilled by the provisions of the organized crime. The “drug industry” pays consistent salaries, ensures minimal standards of assistance, and thus, becomes the only options to the vacuum left by the absence of governmental actions and social programs.

Notwithstanding the need of a strong action, mainly against the center of gravity of these criminal organizations, South American governments believe that the only and lasting way to deal with this threat, is to provide sustainable economical options to the currently unassisted population, subsidizing their way to an adequate pattern of life, in other words, providing them a option out of the criminal cycle.

Despite the difficulties associated to budgetary restrictions, and in some cases, misapplication of government funds, the majority of neoliberal governments in South America are adopting this social relieving course of action, in parallel to an intensive exchange of intelligence and information among police and law enforcement agencies.

On the US side, this social course of action would be more expensive and time demanding, representing a significant drain of US treasury resources, and the results would only come in long-term bases, implying on the financing of economical and industrial infrastructures abroad. Nevertheless, the result would more likely to be definitive, and the image of the providing country, would be more of a real leader. The US presence would have a constructive significance, rather than the actual display of overwhelming power and destruction. These would be the long lasting CBMs that would win the hearts of peoples.

Still on this matter, another difference is the fact the US has encouraged the employ-

ment of military forces to counter “drug cartels” as well as the transnational organized crime. In some instances, suggestions were to review and change the core missions of military forces in South America to specific anti-drug and anti-crime tasks. The fact that the US government opposes this attribution to their own military reinforces the perceptions that the prescriptions recommended envisions, only and exclusively, the US vital interests.

An extra concern and source of resentment that emerged at the end of the bipolar world, and alarmed some South American military establishments, the Brazilian in particular, was the debate that arose in the US about “new threats”, that were said to justify the maintenance of military power at Cold war levels. In the Brazilian perspective, the search for new enemies (if only in the interest of maintaining military budgets) could lead the US to begin seeing threats in the Third World. One of the facts that corroborated these concerns occurred in April of 1990, as the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono, published an article in the journal *Sea Power* in which he argued that the “United States cannot ignore the expanding military power of these countries, and the Army must retain the capability to defeat potential threats wherever they occur. This could mean confronting a well-equipped army in the Third World.”⁹

Finally, the US hegemony is also a topic that prevents the emergence of a common security threat perception in the hemisphere. The asymmetry of power between nations generates, on the uncontested strong side, the tendency of imposition by force, as in the drug trafficking threat in South America, and also as in the course of action adopted to confront the terrorist threat on the Middle East. The unilateral resort to violence, without a clear and collectively consent, generates inconsistencies as in the case of Israel, that justifies its violent war (condemned by the US) over the Palestine nation, claiming the adoption of the same policy stated by the US government — the war against terrorists and the countries that harbor them. On the other side of the mentioned asymmetry of power, the weaker side, the fear of

being the target of a similar aggression or manipulation exists, as the fear of an escalation on Colombia, or a military intervention on Punta Del Este, Paraguay, which is considered as a focus of smuggling and a terrorist safe harbor. The immediate question is — can one talk about collective defense and security, in an area were it threatens with the use of violence?

In conclusion, there are numerous obstacles to the establishment of a security or defense arrangement at hemispheric level, and most of them are related to fear and lack of confidence on US policies toward South America.

Recently, a new hope emerged in the economic environment, the perspective of the implementation a hemispheric agreement known as Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) in 2005. Nevertheless, in the same way that MERCOSUR, despite its success, did not preclude any defense or security agreement, the FTAA, representing an already difficult approach to an economic hemispheric integration, does not underline any decurrent defense or security agreement.

Security from a Brazilian Standpoint

The analysis of a possible future South American or hemispheric defense arrangement or concept, from a Brazilian standpoint, is not a selfish or xenophobic position, but rather, a consequence of this country's actual and prospective situation. Brazil is a major middle size economic power, the eight in size in the world; a leader among the advanced emerging markets; an economy more than twice as large as Russia's, almost large as China's, and twice as India's.¹⁰ The main player in South America, with over half of the region's GDP and population; and one of the largest markets in the world for high-end technology products, with a purchasing power of over US\$ 1 trillion, ranking fifth in the world, after United States, China, Japan, and Germany.¹¹

On the strategic realm, the fact that Brazil shares borders with nine of the eleven other

South American countries, and its decurrent central position, places it as the central player in any continental effort to tackle any common security problem. Therefore, as a conclusion of this preliminary analysis, the option of a Brazilian perspective on a future trend for a South American defense concept is acceptable.

Given its geography, its historical experience, and the line of continuity of its diplomatic activity, Brazil is at ease with the South American component of its international identity. Its immediate peaceful vicinity is propitious to what President Fernando Henrique Cardoso calls — the organization of the South American space. Nevertheless, at the turn of the millennium, shadows of concern related to the so called “new world order” shaped the Brazilian strategic thinking, towards the defense of its sovereignty, as well as have endangered the development of this South American space.¹²

In response to the predictions of an era of international peace, Brazilian military analysts began to explore concepts of contemporary war in this new international setting. Responding to what was considered the utopian description of a “new world order”, they increasingly defend a view of international relations as unpredictable and anarchist. In their analysis, the new reality is of a world where the old principles of international politics — non-intervention and self-determination — have been abandoned, and the interest of the great powers has been disguised as universal idealism. In other words, those basic principles that had governed international relations are, in the contemporary world, ignored by the great powers that preach intervention, provided that, in their exclusive estimate, there is a risk to democracy, a grave violation of human rights, the possibility of ecological tragedy, a threat to peace, or any other noble reason that the idealists of the planet can find at the opportune moment.¹³

Decurrently, the cornerstone of the Brazilian military strategic thinking, at the end of the century, became the defense of national sovereignty, and in particular the Amazonic Re-

gion.

In the view of the Brazilian military, the phantasm that hovers over Amazonia comes from the most advanced countries in the world. This threat has its origins on governments and NGOs in the Northern Hemisphere, seeking to transform the Amazon Region into an area of global interest, building up an image of the region as a complex problem, requiring transnational and supranational solutions, underscoring the international “need” to protect the forest from environmental disaster, and to protect the increasingly threatened rights of the native peoples. This has increasingly come to be labeled as the “internationalization of Amazonia.”¹⁴

While this perceptions have been referred to as “paranoid” even by the Brazilian press¹⁵, and its public reference officially avoided, they are centrally important and recognized on defense circles as an unspoken truth. Nevertheless, the fact is that National Defense Policy white paper, issued in 1996, underscores, in an explicit way, the defense concern with this region.¹⁶

The clearest evidence of this international interest over the Amazonic Region derives from environmental issues, which have gained an especial relevance. Under the aegis of the ecologic and environmental preservation, international organisms as the NGOs, have built and disclosed an extremely negative image of the Brazilian Amazonic region. Under this context, the world has witnessed declarations as the one from President Mitterrand, in the defense of what he believes to be a cause of fundamental importance to humanity — the creation of supranational organisms to guard and act as police enforcement over the governments of the Third World nations, in respect to environmental issues. This statement became known as the principle of the “devoir d’ingerence.”¹⁷

On the regional sphere, the main concern of Brazilian strategists and policymakers are

the obstacles interposed to the development of a genuine South American space, due to an aspect of international security that was modified in the post-Cold War world — the TNTs and their risks to the stability and viability of local institutions and governments.

In South America, these risks stem from the weakness in the state power of some of our neighbors, to deal appropriately with these emerging threats, and the hegemonic pressure of the US government towards a military solution that, preaches the resort of violence, course of action that, while not producing its envisioned results, have the collateral effect creating a social and economical disarray, incompatible with any kind of social or economic development, and all this, within the boundaries of countries with an already depleted economy.

In the Brazilian view, there are different geographical, political, socio-economical and cultural realities among the South, Central and North Americas, and thus, it is difficult to envisage a unique in-depth defense concept, adaptable to these three continental masses.¹⁸ Furthermore, prior to any hemispheric defense arrangement, is necessary the definition, from each of the participating States in this concert, of its perception of threats security and defense.

In short, the current emphasis of the Brazilian defense policies, apart from traditional maritime interests in the South Atlantic, concerns the assurance of the sovereignty on the Amazonic Region, acting against the centrifugal threats of the narcotrafficking, and against the centripetal threats represented the already manifested international interest on the “region’s environmental perseverance”.

Conclusion

From the preceding analyses, becomes evident that, at regional level, the idea of a multinational security or defense agreement is still obscured by reminiscent legacies of rivalries, economical restraints, and the absence of a common perceived internal or external threat, as well as the will to mutual commitment.

The observed approximation between local armed forces, translates the need of breaking a long period of silence and distrust, and the CBMs, already in place are still fertilizing the grounds for a future base of trust and common enterprises.

At hemispheric level, the obstacles for a collective agreement are even greater, and to overcome them, the US, as a world leader, must take over the initiative for closing the already large gap. It will be a long process of convincing South American nations that their vision and perspectives, as well as their sovereignty will always be strictly observed, and that they considered and respected as partners of a hemispheric enterprise and not as “backyard” countries.

Currently, the Brazilian main strategic concern lies on increasing its presence and the security on Amazonic Region. Although recognizing the serious threat interposed by the narco-trafficking, the Brazilian strategic doctrine opposes any kind of alliance or permanent regional defense commitment, as well as its Constitution prohibits the employment of armed forces in law enforcement tasks.

Instead, Brazil supports an increasing awareness of the South American geopolitical space and the preferential resort to peaceful means for settling international disputes. The current interaction among regional armed forces will be continuously encouraged, envisioning the consolidation of the foundation to temporary ad hoc defense arrangements. The same process among security agencies and police forces will continue to be fostered, envisioning an increased efficiency on the combat to the criminal threat in South America.

NOTES

-
- ¹ Kahlil Gibran; *The Prophet*; Alfred A. Knopf, Publisher; New York; 2000.
- ² In the last years, as a consequence of its defeat in Malvinas War, and economical crises, there has been significant cuts on Argentinean military budgets, and following this trend, Argentina is likely to stand at a military deficit compared to Brazil and Chile, and this situation is likely to remain unchanged for some time to come. The awareness of these structural imbalances added to the impossibility, at least in a medium term, to reestablish and maintain a balance of power with regard to Brazil and Chile, is what compels Argentina, more than any other MERCOSUR state, to push for regional integration in security or defense affairs.
- ³ Zackrison, James L. and Godoy, Erwin A.; “Re-thinking regional security in the Americas;” *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*; Alexandria; Mar 2001; <http://www.proquest.com>.
- ⁴ As mentioned in the opening words to the Introduction of this paper.
- ⁵ José Ortega y Gasset; UNAS LECCIONES DE METAFÍSICA; 1966 (written in 1932-33)
- ⁶ Celso Lafer; *Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future*; Boston, Spring 200; Available on the World Wide Web: <http://www.proquest.com>
- ⁷ Zackrison, James L. and Godoy, Erwin A.;
- ⁸ Filho, João R. Martins and Zirker, Daniel; “Nationalism, National Security, and Amazonia – Perceptions and Attitudes in Contemporary Brazil;” *Armed Forces and Society*; Fall 2000; Available on the World Wide Web:<http://proquest.com>.
- ⁹ Ibid
- ¹⁰ Stephan Robert and Kenneth Maxwell; *A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on U.S. Policy Toward Brazil*; Council on Foreign Relations; February 2001; Retrieved from World Wide Net: <http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/mak01/index.html> [Oct, 26 2001].
- ¹¹ Ibid
- ¹² Celso Lafer;
- ¹³ Ibid
- ¹⁴ Ibid
- ¹⁵ Folha de São Paulo; Ed. December 4, 1995.
- ¹⁶ Filho, João R. Martins and Zirker, Daniel;
- ¹⁷ Alvaro De Souza Pinheiro; “Guerrilha Na Amazônia: Uma Experiência no Passado, o Presente e o Futuro;” *Air Power Journal*; 2nd Trimester, 1995; Available on the World

Wide Web:<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-p/pinheiro.html>

¹⁸ Celso Lafer;